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ABSTRACT 
Group Contest Success Functions    
by Johannnes Münster * 
This paper extends the axiomatic characterization of contest success functions 
of Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998) to contests between groups. 
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JEL Classification: C70, D72, D74 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Group Contest Success Functions 
Eine "contest success function" beschreibt, wie in einem Wettkampf die 
Gewinnwahrscheinlichkeiten von den Einsätzen der Beteiligten abhängen. 
Dieser Aufsatz verallgemeinert die auf Skaperdas (1996) und Clark und Riis 
(1998) zurückgehende axiomatische Fundierung von contest success functions, 
indem er Wettkämpfe zwischen Gruppen untersucht.  
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 1 Introduction
Contests often take place between groups. In lobbying and rent-seeking con-
tests, many lobbyists work together on the same side. In R&D races, groups
of researchers team together in order to develop new technologies earlier than
rival teams. Further examples are wars and sport tournaments. By now there
is a substantial literature on group contests.1
Skaperdas (1996) provides, in an important paper, an axiomatic char-
acterization of contest success functions. He deals with contests between
individuals. Clark and Riis (1998) generalize Skaperdas (1996) by dropping
the assumption of symmetry. The purpose of the present paper is to extend
these axiomatic foundations to contests between groups. In a group contest,
each member of a group can invest time, resources, or eﬀort in order to in-
crease the probability of his group winning.2 Ip r o p o s eas e to fa x i o m sf o r
group contests that are close analogues to those studied by Skaperdas (1996)
and Clark and Riis (1998). In particular, if each group consists of only one
individual, then the axioms are similar to the axioms in Skaperdas (1996).
Following Clark and Riis (1998), however, I allow for asymmetries. This is
natural for group contests since groups may have diﬀerent sizes.
Skaperdas (1996, Theorem 1) shows that, under a set of reasonable ax-




whenever the denominator is positive, where xj is the eﬀort of individual
j, and the function f : R+ → R+ is sometimes referred to as the impact
function. The axioms laid out below generalize this to group contests and
1For surveys, see Garﬁnkel and Skaperdas (2006, Section 7), Corchón (2007, Section
4.2), and Konrad (2007, Sections 6.4 and 7).
2A related situation arises in multi-activity contests between individuals as studied in
Epstein and Hefeker (2003), Arbatskaya and Mialon (2007), and Caruso (2006). Here,
each individual chooses several activities that help in winning the contest.
1allow for asymmetries (Theorem 1). Under these axioms, whenever at least
one individual chooses a strictly positive eﬀort, the probability of group g





where for each group k, xk denotes the vector of eﬀorts of the mk members
of group k, and fk : R
mk
+ → R+ is a non-negative and strongly increasing
function.
Moreover, Skaperdas (1996, Theorem 2) shows that, if the contest success
function if homogenous of degree zero, his axioms imply a Tullock contest
success function. The generalization to a group contest given here (Theorem
2) results in a contest success function of the form given in (1), where all the
impact functions fk are homogeneous of the same degree. I also generalize
the axiomatic foundation of a logistic contest success function (Theorem 3).
Finally, I consider an axiom stating that the probability of success remains
unchanged if the eﬀort of one individual increases by some amount while
the eﬀort of another individual belonging to the same group decreases by
the same amount. This leads to functional forms for group contest success
functions that have frequently been used in the literature.3 If the contest
success function is homogeneous of degree zero, a natural generalization of
the Tullock contest success function results: the impact functions in (1) are
multiples of a power function of the sum of the eﬀorts of the group’s members.
A similar statement holds for the logistic contest success function.
This paper has grown out of appendix 8.1 of Münster (2004). It is related
to other axiomatic work on contest success functions such as Blavatskyy
(2004) on contests with ties, Arbatskaya and Mialon (2007) and Rai and
Sarin (2007) on multi-activity contests, and to other approaches to contest
3A partial list is: Katz, Nitzan and Rosenberg (1990), Nitzan (1991), Katz and
Tokatlido (1996), Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1997), Wärneryd (1998), Esteban and Ray
(2001), Müller and Wärneryd (2001), Garﬁnkel (2004a, 2004b), Baik (2007), Inderst,
Müller and Wärneryd (2007), Münster (2007), Münster and Staal (2007).
2success functions such as Epstein and Nitzan (2006, 2007) and Jia (2008).
Rai and Sarin (2007) is perhaps the most closely related; they independently
cover similar ground as Theorems 1 and 2 below, but do not discuss the
generalization of the logistic contest success function, or the summation case.
2M a i n a x i o m s
There are n individuals and G groups. Each individual is a member of exactly
one group. Group g has mg ≥ 1 members,
PG
g=1 mg = n. The set of groups
is denoted by Γ = {1,...,G}. The inter-group contest eﬀort of individual i in
group g is xig ∈ R+. For the purpose of the present paper, it is immaterial





be the mg−vector of eﬀorts of the members of group
g, x =( x1,...,xG) the n−vector that collects all individual eﬀorts, x−g the
(n − mg)−vector of the eﬀorts of all players who do not belong to group
g, and x−ig the (n − 1)−vector of all eﬀorts except the eﬀort of player i in










of the eﬀorts of members of groups g that belong to M.
For any group g ∈ Γ, it is assumed that there exists a function pg : Rn
+ →
R+,w h e r epg (x) can be interpreted as the probability that group g wins the
contest. Alternatively, pg (x) can also be interpreted as the share of some




g=1 pg (x)=1and pg (x) ≥ 0 for all g ∈ Γ.
Axiom 2 (Monotonicity) For all g ∈ Γ and all i ∈ {1,..,m g} : if ˆ xig >x ig,
then
i) pg (ˆ xig,x−ig) ≥ pg (xig,x−ig), with strict inequality unless pg (xig,x−ig)=1 ,
and
ii) for all k 6= g, k ∈ Γ : pk (ˆ xig,x−ig) ≤ pk (xig,x−ig).
3A1 says that pg (x) is a probability. A2 says that it is strictly increasing
in the eﬀort of any member of the group; the only exception being that the
group already wins with probability one, in which case the probability of
winning stays constant when the eﬀort of a member increases. Moreover,
a group’s probability of winning is weakly decreasing in the eﬀorts of the
individuals who belong to the other groups. A2 implies that, if xig > 0 for
some i in group g, then pg (x) > 0. This rules out the perfectly discriminating
CSF (or all-pay auction) considered in Baik, Kim and Na (2001) and Konrad
(2004), where a group wins with probability one if the sum of the eﬀorts of
individuals in this group is higher than the sum of the eﬀorts of the members
of any competing group. This CSF, however, can be viewed as the limit of
the CSF axiomatized in Proposition 2 below.4
Skaperdas’ (1996) third axiom is a symmetry assumption. I do not impose
any symmetry for the main results. For completeness, however, I discuss the
impact of assuming symmetry.
Axiom 3 (Between-group-anonymity) A contest success function satisﬁes










A3 says that the contest is fair between groups of equal size and the
identities of the groups do not matter per se. It should be contrasted with
anonymity within groups:
Axiom 3’ (Within-group-anonymity) A contest success function satisﬁes
within-group-anonymity if, for any group g ∈ Γ and for any bijection ψ :
{1,...,m g} → {1,...,m g},
pg (xg,x−g)=pg (ˆ xg,x−g),
4Similarly, A2 implies that the impact function cannot be Cobb Douglas, weakest link,
or best shot. These impact functions, however, are limit cases of a family of CES functions
consistent with Theorem 2 below.




is the vector of eﬀorts of the members of
group g after a permutation according to ψ.
Between-group-anonymity (A3) and within-group-anonymity (A3’) are
diﬀerent, even if all groups are of equal size. For example, suppose that




a(bx11+x21)+(bx12+x22), x 6= 0,
1
2, otherwise.
Here, and in the following, 0 =( 0 ,...,0) denotes the vector of appropriate
length where every component is equal to zero. If a = b =1 , both A3 and
A3’ hold; if a =16= b, only A3 holds; if a 6=1=b, only A3’ holds; ﬁnally, if
a 6=1and b 6=1 , neither A3 nor A3’ holds.5
The next two axioms concern the CSF for a contest among fewer groups.
Axiom 4 (Subcontest consistency) Let pM
g (x) be group g’s probability of
winning a subcontest played by a subset M ⊂ Γ consisting of at least two







∀x s.t. xM 6= 0.
Axiom 5 (Subcontest independence) pM
g (x) is independent of the eﬀorts of
individuals belonging to groups not in M.
A 4i m p l i e st h a tc o n t e s t sa m o n gf e w e rg r o u p so rm o r eg r o u p sa r eq u a l i t a -
tively similar. Note that the equation is well deﬁned since xM 6= 0, i.e. there
is some k ∈ M and i ∈ {1,...,m k} s.t. xik > 0, and thus, by A2, pk (x) > 0.
A5 is related to the independence of irrelevant alternatives in the context of
individual probabilistic choice.
5In the context of a multi-activity contest, within-group-anonymity seems a strong
assumption, since the activities may have a diﬀerent impact on the winning probabilities.
One may want to model this in the CSF, as in Epstein and Hefeker (2003).
5For the main results, A1, A2, A4 and A5 are assumed to hold. The
approach is to derive the CSF for any subcontest of some bigger contest. In
this way, A4 and A5 can also be used to derive the CSF for a contest between
only two groups.
Axioms 1-5 reformulate the assumptions in Skaperdas (1996) for an inter-
group contest. In particular, if there is only one individual in each group,
A1-A5 are similar to the corresponding axioms in Skaperdas (1996). For
further motivations and discussions of the axioms, see also Clark and Riis
(1998) and Corchón (2007).
3 Results
Following Jehle and Reny (2001, p. 437), a function f : Rk
+ → R+ is said to
be strongly increasing whenever ˆ zi ≥ zi for all i ∈ {1,...,k} and ˆ zj >z j for
at least one j ∈ {1,...,k} implies f (ˆ z1,...,ˆ zk) >f(z1,...,zk).
Theorem 1 Suppose the contest success function satisﬁes A1, A2, A4, and
A5. Let M be any proper subset of Γ consisting of at least two groups. Then,
for each g ∈ M, there exists a non-negative and strongly increasing function
fg : R
mg







∀x s.t. xM 6= 0. (2)
Proof. Since M is a proper subset of Γ, there exist a group a ∈ Γ\M. Fix










∀x s.t. xM 6= 0, xa = a 6= 0. (3)















∀x s.t. xa = a 6= 0.





a (xa,x−a) depend only on xa and xk.B y ﬁxing xa = a 6= 0, one
can thus deﬁne, for each k ∈ M, a non-negative function fk : R
mk





Next I show that fk is strongly increasing. Suppose ˆ xik >x ik. From A2,
pa (ˆ xik,x−ik) ≤ pa (xik,x−ik), moreover
pk (ˆ xik,x−ik) >p k (xik,x−ik) ∀x−ik s.t. xa = a 6= 0,






∀x−ik s.t. xa = a 6= 0.








∀x s.t. xM 6= 0, xa = a 6= 0.
By A5, pM







∀x s.t. xM 6= 0.
7In the literature on contests between individuals, the function fg is some-
times called the impact function. I follow this terminology. In the present
setting, the impact function aggregates the individual eﬀorts chosen by mem-
bers of a group to a single number.
Note that, if a CSF is of form (2), and for the case xM= 0 some tie-
breaking rule that is consistent with the axioms is assumed, then the CSF
fulﬁlls A1, A2, A4, and A5 everywhere on its domain. Similar converse
statements hold for all the results derived below.
The implications of adding anonymity to A1, A2, A4 and A5 are straight-
forward. Between-group-anonymity (A3) requires that, if mg = mk, then
fg (z)=fk (z) for all z ∈ R
mg
+ . In contrast, within-group-anonymity (A3’)
requires that, for each group, the impact function fg is symmetric.
3.1 Homogeneity
To derive a Tullock CSF, Skaperdas (1996) assumes that the CSF is homo-
geneous of degree zero. A6 generalizes this for group contests.
Axiom 6 For all λ>0 and all g ∈ Γ,p g (λx)=pg (x).
A6 implies that, if all individuals double their eﬀorts, the probabilities of
success remain unchanged. Moreover, the CSF is independent of the unit of
measurement, which seems an attractive property.
Theorem 2 If the contest success function satisﬁes A1, A2, A4, A5, and
A6, then it satisﬁes (2) and the impact functions fk are homogeneous of the
same degree r>0.
Proof. From A4 and A6, if xM 6= 0, then pM
k (λx)=pM
k (x) for all λ>0
and all k ∈ M. Thus by Theorem 1, for all xk ∈ R
mk








8where 1 =( 1 ,...,1) is the mk-vector where every component is equal to one.
Deﬁne F (xk)=fk (xk)/fk (1). Then
F (λxk)=F (λ1)F (xk). (4)
In particular, if xk = t1 where t>0,
F (λt1)=F (λ1)F (t1).
Deﬁne G(λ)=F (λ1). Note that G is a strictly increasing function of a
single variable. Moreover, G(λt)=G(λ)G(t).
In order to transform this equation into a Cauchy equation (cf. Aczél
1969), substitute λ =e x p( λ






Let H (s)=G(exp(s)).T h e nH (λ
0 + t0)=H (λ
0)H (t0). Finally, let h(s)=






Since G is strictly increasing, h is strictly increasing and thus continuous
almost everywhere. Under this condition, the only solution to (5) is given by
h(s)=rs where r>0 (Aczél 1966, p. 34). Thus H (s)=e x p( rs),
G(s)=H (lns)=e x p( rln(s)) = s
r,
and F (λ1)=G(λ)=λ
r. Inserting this in (4) gives F (λxk)=λ
rF (xk).B y
deﬁnition of F (xk),
fk (λxk)=F (λxk)fk (1)=λ
rF (xk)fk (1)=λ
rfk (xk).
The above argument shows that, for any group k ∈ M, whenever xk 6= 0,
fk (λxk)=λ
rf (xk), where r>0. From A6, r is the same for all groups.
9Now suppose that xk = 0 for some k ∈ M. Fix some xg 6= 0 for each
















g∈M,g6=k fg (xg) > 0, it follows that fk (0)=0 . Therefore,
fk is homogeneous of degree r on R
mk
+ .
To see the relation to the axiomatic foundation of a Tullock CSF for con-
tests between individuals (Skaperdas 1996, Theorem 2), note that a function
f : R+ → R+ of a single variable is homogeneous if and only if it can be
written as f (x)=axr, where a = f (1) and r is the degree of homogeneity
(Carter 2001, p. 351). Thus, if every group consists of only one individual,
Theorem 2 immediately gives a Tullock CSF.
A1-A6 are compatible with several functional forms of the impact func-









,r> 0,α 6=0 . (6)
Other potentially interesting impact functions can be seen as limit cases,
since they are limits of (6) but lead to a violation of A2. A case in point
is the Cobb-Douglas function, which violates the strict inequality in A2 (i),








, which are related to Hirshleifer’s (1983)
weakest-link and best-shot technologies for the production of public goods.6
6Some of the examples of private supply of public goods given by Hirshleifer (1983) to
motivate these technologies are actually about contests between groups. Consider missile
defence: only one rocket needs to hit an incoming ICBM in order to destroy it. See also
Clark and Konrad (2007).
103.2 An alternative to homogeneity
Relying on data from Dupuy (1987), Hirshleifer (1989, 1991) argues for a
logistic CSF. He points out that the logistic CSF ﬁts some ‘stylized facts’
from military warfare, in particular, that being just a little stronger than
one’s rival provides a big advantage. For contests between individuals, the
logistic CSF can be derived by assuming that the probabilities of success do
not change if a constant is added to the eﬀort of each individual (Skaperdas
1996, Theorem 3). To generalize this to group contests, consider the following
alternative to A6. Let 1 =( 1 ,...,1) denote the vector of appropriate length
where every component is equal to one.
Axiom 7 For all λ>0, and all g ∈ Γ,
pg (x + λ1)=pg (x).
Theorem 3 If the contest success function satisﬁes A1, A2, A4, A5, and
A7, then it satisﬁes (2) and the impact functions fk satisfy, for all λ>0,
fk (λ1 + xk)=e x p( rλ)fk (xk) (7)
where r>0 is a parameter.
Proof. From A4 and A7, for all λ>0 and all k ∈ M,
p
M
k (x + λ1)=p
M
k (x) ∀x s.t. xM 6= 0. (8)
11Suppose that fk (0)=0. Then one can derive a contradiction as follows: when-
















g6=k,g∈M fg (xg + 1)
> 0.
The right hand side of the ﬁrst line is well deﬁned since xh 6= 0. The second
line is from Theorem 1, the third from (8), the fourth from Theorem 1, and
the inequality from the strong monotonicity of fk. It follows that fk (0) > 0.
By Theorem 1 and (8), for all xk ∈ R
mk
+ ,






Deﬁne F (s)=fk (s)/fk (0). Thus
F (λ1 + xk)=F (λ1)F (xk). (9)
For xk = k1 where k>0,F((λ + k)1)=F (λ1)F (k1). Let G(s)=
F (s1). Then G(λ + k)=G(λ)G(k). Finally, let H (s)=l n( G(s)) to get
H (λ + k)=H (λ)+H (k). Since H is strictly monotone, it is continuous
almost everywhere, and the only solution is H (s)=rs. Thus
F (s1)=G(s)=e x p( H (s)) = exp(rs).
12Inserting this in (9), F (λ1 + xk)=e x p( rλ)F (xk). Thus by deﬁnition of F,
fk (λ1 + xk)=F (λ1 + xk)fk (0)=e x p( rλ)F (xk)fk (0)
=e x p ( rλ)fk (xk).
The relation between Theorem 3 and the corresponding axiomatization of
a logistic CSF for contests between individuals is pointed out in the following
lemma.
Lemma 1 Suppose that f is a function of a single variable, f (0) > 0, and
f satisﬁes (7). Then, for all t ≥ 0,f(t)=aexp(rt), where a = f (0) is a
positive constant.
Proof. In (7), let xk =0to get f (λ)=e x p( rλ)f (0). The lemma follows
by substituting t for λ.
By Lemma 1 and Theorem 3, in the case mg =1for all g, the only
CSF satisfying A1, A2, A4, A5, and A7 is the logistic CSF proposed by
Hirshleifer (1989, 1991). With groups consisting of several players, (7) is
satisﬁed, for example, by fk (xk)=e x p(
Pmk
i=1 xik). This functional form will
be studied in more detail in the next section. It is, however, not the only
functional form satisfying (7). Another example is as follows. Let mg =2
and fg (x1g,x 2g)=e x p
¡





Many papers have assumed that only the sum of the eﬀorts of the individuals
in the same group matters. To give an axiomatic foundation for this, consider
the following axiom.















forall i,j ∈ {1,...,m g} and all g ∈ Γ.
In words, A8 says that if one member of group g puts in more eﬀort while
another member of the same group reduces his eﬀorts by the same amount,
the probability of group g winning is unaﬀected. A8 seems reasonable, for
example, when eﬀorts are amounts of money that are pooled within a given
group. It is less reasonable in other applications, such as team sports. A8
implies within-group-anonymity (A3’), but not vice versa: for example, (6)
with α 6=1satisﬁes A3’, but not A8.
Proposition 1 If the contest success function satisﬁes A1, A2, A4, A5, and







where φg : R+ → R+ is non-negative and strictly increasing.



































A CSF as characterized in Proposition 1 has been used in Skaperdas
(1998) and in Inderst, Müller, and Wärneryd (2007). Adding Homogeneity
(A6) results in the following generalization of the Tullock CSF:
14Proposition 2 If the contest success function satisﬁes A1, A2, A4, A5, A6,







where ag,r>0 are parameters.
Proof. From Proposition 1 and Theorem 2, we have (10) and that φg is ho-
mogeneous. Proposition 2 follows from the fact that a homogeneous function
of one variable is a multiple of a power function (Carter 2001, p. 351).
CSFs as characterized in Proposition 2 have been used, for example, in
Skaperdas (1998), Garﬁnkel (2004a, 2004b), Inderst, Müller, and Wärneryd
(2005), and Münster (2007). The limiting case where r →∞is the all-
pay auction considered in Baik, Kim and Na (2001) and in Konrad (2004).
Münster and Staal (2007) use a logistic CSF as characterized in the following
Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 If the contest success function satisﬁes A1, A2, A4, A5, A7,









where ag,r>0 are parameters.
Proof. From Theorem 3, Proposition 1, and Lemma 1.
Assuming A8 can make a diﬀerence for equilibrium characterizations and
comparative static results in models of group contests. For each group, the
impact fg (xg) can be thought of as a public good for group g. If it is assumed
that groups cannot enforce individual eﬀorts, given x−g, members of group
g play a game of private provision of a public good. The impact function fg
describes the production technology of the public good; it is similar to what
15is called the social composition function in the literature on private provision
of public goods. Properties of the social composition function are impor-
tant for results concerning free riding and comparative statics, in particular
concerning inequality (see Hirshleifer 1983, Cornes 1993, Ray, Baland, and
Dagnelie 2007). Clearly, this is relevant for models of group contests.
4C o n c l u s i o n
This paper extends Skaperdas’ (1996) and Clark and Riis’ (1998) axiomatic
foundation of contest success functions to contests between groups. It thereby
gives a foundation to many contest success functions that have frequently
been used in the literature on group contests.
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